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We examine the Ricardian Equivalence proposition for a panel of OECD countries
in the 80s and 90s by estimating a nonlinear dynamic consumption function. We
estimate this function with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using moment
conditions that allow us to use information from the levels of the variables included
in the consumption function. To examine the performance of this nonlinear GMM
estimator and to obtain small sample critical values for the test statistics we apply
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certainty equivalence.
JEL Classiﬁcations: E21, E62, C33
Keywords: Ricardian Equivalence, rule-of-thumb, precaution, panel data, GMM,
bootstrap
∗Thanks to Freddy Heylen for useful comments and suggestions. Thanks to Gerdie Everaert for useful
comments and suggestions and for letting us use his HP Proliant ML370 server. This allowed us to save
time on the two-level bootstrap simulations. We wish to acknowledge support from the Interuniversity
Attraction Poles Program - Belgian Science Policy, contract no. P5/21.
†Sherppa (Ghent University) and Fund for Scientiﬁc Research (FWO, Flanders, Belgium),
Griet.Malengier@ugent.be.
‡Sherppa (Ghent University) and Fund for Scientiﬁc Research (FWO, Flanders, Belgium),
Lorenzo.Pozzi@ugent.be.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Ricardian Equivalence proposition (Barro 1974) states that the government choice to
ﬁnance a given amount of expenditures with taxes or with debt is irrelevant for the econ-
omy. The assumptions under which the proposition holds are that agents are inﬁnitely
lived, rational, perfectly informed, and have no precautionary savings motive (i.e. the
certainty equivalence result). Further, there are no liquidity constraints for consumers,
governments do not engage in Ponzi games and taxes are lump-sum. Under these con-
ditions debt-ﬁnanced tax cuts, for instance, do not increase private consumption because
consumers expect a tax increase sometime in the future if the government is to satisfy its
intertemporal budget constraint. Consumers save the tax cut so that total economy-wide
savings and thus interest rates do not change. Aggregate demand and output are unaf-
fected. For early overviews of the theoretical and empirical literature on the Ricardian
Equivalence proposition we refer to Bernheim (1987) and Seater (1993). As far as the
empirical testing of the proposition is concerned, a large number of studies have tested
it by estimating consumption functions that are derived from the ﬁrst-order condition of
a maximization problem and that incorporate one or more speciﬁcd e v i a t i o n sf r o mt h e
theorem (i.e. the Euler equation approach). For instance, Evans (1988) and Haque (1988)
use Blanchard’s (1985) model to test whether consumers have ﬁnite horizons. Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) and Evans and Karras (1998) investigate the importance of liquidity
constraints. Dalamagas (1994) investigates whether consumers are myopic or irrational.
Others like Haque and Montiel (1989) , Rockerbie (1997), Lopez et al. (2000), and Pozzi
(2003) investigate two or more deviations from Ricardian Equivalence simultaneously. In
most of these studies strict Ricardian Equivalence is rejected. It should be noted that
almost all these studies use a time series approach to test the proposition on one or more
individual countries. Two panel studies that test for (deviations from) the Ricardian
Equivalence proposition are Evans and Karras (1998) and Lopez et al. (2000). In both
studies the Ricardian Equivalence proposition is rejected.
In this paper we investigate the Ricardian Equivalence proposition for a panel of OECD
2countries in the 1980s and 1990s. We derive and estimate a nonlinear consumption func-
tion from a model that allows for the presence of two consumer types: rule-of-thumb
current income consumers and optimizing, permanent income consumers who incorporate
the government budget constraint. Besides rule-of-thumb consumption (see also Evans
and Karras 1998 and Lopez et al. 2000) a second deviation from Ricardian Equivalence
is incorporated in the model, namely the possibility that permanent income consumers
consume less in each period than what they would consume under certainty equivalence,
i.e. they have a lower marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income. This
reﬂects a precautionary savings motive which has, to the best of our knowledge, not been
tested before via consumers’ marginal propensity.
Methodologically, the focus of the paper lies on avoiding information loss in both
the derivation and the estimation of the model and on correct small sample inference.
As far as the ﬁrst issue is concerned, we note that many studies in the Euler equation
tradition derive consumption equations that are either in ﬁrst diﬀerences or in growth
rates (see Lopez et al. 2000 and Evans and Karras 1998). While this may be desirable in
a time-series context because of stationarity concerns, it may be problematic in a panel
context.1 The reason is that panel data estimation in the presence of endogenous or
predetermined variables necessitates some kind of transformation to get rid of country-
speciﬁc heterogeneity. As shown by Nickell (1981) transforming the data in deviations
from the country-speciﬁc means leads to biased estimates if the time dimension of the
panel is modest.2 Therefore it is common to transform the data in ﬁrst-diﬀerences to
get rid of the country-speciﬁce ﬀect (i.e. the estimators of Anderson and Hsiao 1982
and Arellano and Bond 1991). If the equation that is estimated is in ﬁrst-diﬀerences or
in growth rates to begin with, a ﬁrst-diﬀerence transform implies an equation in second
diﬀerences or in ﬁrst diﬀerences of growth rates. This implies a large loss of information and
potential instrumentation problems (see the problems associated with the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
1The trend properties of the variables in the estimated equation are irrelevant for the asymptotic
properties of large N panel data estimators (where N is the number of cross-sections).
2Judson and Owen (1999) use Monte Carlo simulations to show that even for a time dimension as large
as 30 biases may be substantial when using the within estimator to estimate a dynamic panel model.
3estimators as discussed in for instance Blundell and Bond 1998). To avoid these problems,
ﬁrst, we derive an empirical speciﬁcation that is in levels and not in ﬁrst-diﬀerences or
growth rates. Second, we use an estimation method that gets rid of the unobserved
heterogeneity without resorting to a transformation of the data in deviations from country-
speciﬁc means (as in Evans and Karras 1998) or resorting to a mere transformation of
the data in ﬁrst-diﬀerences (as in Lopez et al. 2000). More speciﬁcally, we estimate
our nonlinear consumption function with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimator using moment conditions of the type suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). Estimation with these moment conditions allows us to use
information from the levels of the variables included in the consumption function. To the
best of our knowledge, this type of moment condition has not yet been used in a nonlinear
GMM framework before. The second methodological issue we focus on is small sample
inference. It is well-known that GMM estimation is not without problems when applied
to samples typically encountered in practice (see Tauchen 1986). We use both one-level
and two-level bootstraps to conduct inference and to check whether point estimates and
estimated standard errors are biased.
The main conclusions from estimating our consumption function for 16 to 19 OECD
countries are, ﬁrst, that over the period 1980-1997 the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers
in these economies is around 25%. Second, the remaining 75% forward-looking consumers
have a marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income that is somewhat lower
than what we would expect in the certainty equivalence case that underlies Ricardian
Equivalence. These conclusions also hold for subsamples (i.e. taking the 80s and 90s
seperately). Thus, Ricardian Equivalence is rejected. This is in line with most of the
literature (see e.g. the recent overview given by Lopez et al. 2000). Third, the speciﬁcation
test we use does not reject the validity of our model. Fourth, we do not reject the moment
conditions suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that
allow us to use information from the levels of the variables in our estimations. Fifth,
our GMM estimates are not biased but the estimated asymptotic standard errors severely
understate the small sample standard errors and the asymptotic distributions of the test
4statistics prove to be a poor guide for small sample inference. By using appropriate
bootstrap standard errors and bootstrap distributions we are able to conduct inference in
a more reliable manner.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we derive a consumption function
that allows us to estimate the number of rule-of-thumb current income consumers versus
the number of optimizing (Ricardian) consumers. In section 3 we extensively discuss
the estimation method we think is the most convenient to avoid information loss and
to conduct correct inference in a small sample. In section 4 data issues are discussed.
In section 5 we present the results of estimating our speciﬁcation for a panel of OECD
countries in the 80s and 90s. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a theoretical framework in which a group of consumers follows
current income. Another group of consumers is fully optimizing and (weakly) Ricardian.
We derive a testable consumption function with variables expressed in levels.
Suppose there are two consumer types in the real economy: rule-of-thumb current
income consumers and optimizing permanent income consumers. As a ﬁrst type, rule-of-
thumb consumers base their consumption decisions on current income because of liquidity
constraints (see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw 1990, 1991), myopia (see e.g. Flavin 1985),
precaution (see e.g. Carroll 1994), ﬁnite horizons (see e.g. Gali 1990) or imperfect in-
formation (see e.g. Goodfriend 1992) . We assume that these consumers consume their
entire disposable income in each period so that their consumption c1t c a nb ew r i t t e na s ,
c1t = λ(yt − tt) (1)
where yt is pre-tax labour income in the economy, tt are net taxes, and the parameter
λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) denotes the fraction of disposable income in the economy that goes to
rule-of-thumb consumers. The second type, optimizing inﬁnitely lived permanent income
5consumers, maximize V = Et
P∞
j=0(1 + ρ)−j log(c2t+j) where c2t is consumption of this
type of consumers, Et is the expectations operator conditional on information available
to consumers in period t, and ρ (0 <ρ<1) is their subjective rate of time prefer-
ence. Maximization occurs subject to the budget restriction c2t+(1+r)−1(wt+1+bt+1)=
(1−λ)(yt−tt)+(wt+bt) where wt is private ﬁnancial wealth (excluding government bonds)
at the beginning of period t, bt is government debt at the beginning of period t, and r is















c2t =1where the conditional uncentered second moment of consump-
tion growth is assumed to be constant and is denoted by σ2 (see Appendix A). We obtain
Etc2t+1 = kc2t (∀t)w h e r ek =( σ2(1 + r)+2 r +1− ρ)(1 + r)−1.
Imposing a transversality condition on the budget constraint of the optimizing per-
manent income consumers, we can write this constraint as
P∞
j=0(1 + r)−jEtc2t+j =
wt + bt +
P∞
j=0(1 + r)−jEt(1 − λ)(yt+j − tt+j). Substituting the linearized ﬁrst-order




(1 + r)−jEt[(1 − λ)(yt+j − tt+j)] + wt + bt) (2)
where β =( r2 + ρ − (1 + r)σ2)/(1 + r)2 is the marginal propensity to consume out of
permanent income.3 If σ2 =0and r = ρ we have β = r/(1+r). In that case eq.(2) is the
textbook permanent income result (i.e. the certainty equivalence case). Given that log
utility implies convex marginal utility, there is a ”precautionary savings” motive reﬂected
by σ2 that tends to lower consumption relative to the certainty equivalence case.
Note further that we assume that permanent income consumers discount future dis-
posable income at a rate equal to the interest rate r. Preliminary estimations of a more
complicated model in which the discount rate of these consumers may exceed the discount
3Log utility is basically a special case of the standard CRRA type of utility function with the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion restricted to be equal to 1. Our analysis can be extended to a more general utility
function with unrestricted but constant relative risk aversion in which case β will be a function of risk
aversion as well.
6rate of the government r by a mark-up that reﬂects the length of the consumers’ horizon
(see Blanchard 1985) gave point estimates very close to zero.4 Note that in most studies
that add rule-of-thumb consumers to Blanchard’s ﬁnite horizon speciﬁcation, this mark-up
is found not to be diﬀerent from zero (see Haque and Montiel 1989 and Rockerbie 1997 as
well as Lopez et al. 2000 who show this result for a panel of OECD countries). We there-
fore consider the assumption of equal discount rates for consumers and the government to
be appropriate.
If permanent income consumers optimize fully, they take the intertemporal government
budget constraint into account, i.e. they are Ricardian. Given that, as noted above, our
model does not rule out precaution, we say that consumers are weakly Ricardian.5 The





gt are government expenditures (government consumption and investment). Substituting




(1 + r)−jEt[(1 − λ)(yt+j − gt+j)] + wt + λbt) (3)
Note that in eq.(3) government debt plays a larger role in permanent income if the
fraction of income going to rule-of-thumb consumers is larger. The reason is that a part of
the future tax implications of debt will be paid for by these consumers so that a fraction
λ of bt will be wealth for Ricardian consumers.
Total consumption ct can be written as,
ct = c1t + c2t (4)
Substituting eqs.(1) and (3) into eq.(4) and using the quasi-diﬀerence approach by
Hayashi (1982)6 to remove the unobservables, we obtain the following testable speciﬁcation
4These point estimates were obtained while restricting this mark-up to be larger than or equal to zero
during estimation. The results for the other parameters are identical whether or not a mark-up is added
as an additional parameter.
5Strict Ricardian Equivalence rules out precaution. Consumers are strictly Ricardian if σ
2 =0 .
6Note that other solution methods are possible. Himarios (1995) ﬁnds that, in models where rule-of-
thumb consumers are included, mathematically equivalent ways of solving the consumer Euler equation
give similar estimation results in a time series context.
7for total private consumption,
ct =( 1 + r)ct−1 + λ(yt − (1 + r)yt−1) − λ(tt − (1 + r)tt−1) (5)
+β(wt − (1 + r)wt−1)+βλ(bt − (1 + r)bt−1)
−β(1 − λ)(1 + r)yt−1 + β(1 − λ)(1 + r)gt−1 + ηt
where for the error term ηt we have that Et−jηt =0(∀j>0). We refer to the appendix
B for the derivation of this equation. Note that the consumption function is in levels.
The rest of the paper deals with the testing of the model and with the estimation of
β and λ conditional on values imposed on r (see section 3). Note that (weak) Ricardian
Equivalence holds if λ =0 . If in addition β = r(1+r)−1, then strict Ricardian Equivalence
holds. Note further that β>r (1 + r)−1 implies that impatience has a relatively strong
eﬀect on current consumption compared to precaution. The opposite is implied by β<
r(1 + r)−1.
3 Estimation issues
In this section we discuss our empirical approach. The focus is on avoiding information
loss and on problems of inference in a relatively small sample.
3.1 Empirical speciﬁcation and moment conditions
Simplifying notation and adding a cross-sectional dimension to eq.(5), we obtain an em-
pirical speciﬁcation that we can estimate using a panel of countries,
cit = f(cit−1,xit,x it−1,ψ)+µi + ηit (6)
where i (i =1 ,...,N) refers to cross-section, t (t =1 ,...,T) continues to refer to
time periods, f(.) is a non-linear function in ψ, µi is an unobserved country-speciﬁci n -
tercept, ψ is a 2 × 1 vector given by ψ =( β,λ)0,a n dxit is a 5 × 1 vector given by
8xit =( yit,t it,g it,w it,b it)0. To avoid numerical problems given our highly nonlinear speciﬁ-
cation, the real interest rate r is ﬁxed to a number of values during estimation. This is in
line with the literature (see e.g. Evans 1993 , Lopez et al. 2000). The methodology we use
to estimate eq.(6) must tackle a number of empirical diﬃculties. First, it must allow for
correlation between the individual eﬀect µi and the regressors. Second, it must deal with
the endogeneity of (some of the) regressors with respect to private consumption. Third, it
must deal with potential problems of heteroskedasticity both in time and across countries.
Finally, it must take into account the fact that the error term ηit is not necessarily white
noise (as derived in the theory in the previous section) but may exhibit autocorrelation
of the moving average form of order one (i.e. an MA(1) error) due to time aggregation
(Working 1960), the presence of transitory consumption or problems associated with con-
sumer durables (Mankiw 1982). The currently most popular approach to deal with these
problems would be to ﬁrst-diﬀerence eq.(6) directly to eliminate µi (see Anderson and
Hsiao 1982). This gives,
∆cit = f(∆cit−1,∆xit,∆xit−1,ψ)+∆ηit (7)
Valid moment conditions given the potential MA(1) structure of ηit are,
E [cit−s∆ηit]=0 (8)
E [xit−s∆ηit]=0 (9)
for t =4 ,...,T and s ≥ 3. These conditions can be used in a GMM framework to
estimate ψ consistently (i.e. the ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
1991). Besides the obvious information loss involved in transforming the data, an impor-
tant shortcoming of estimating a ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation is that, since the macroeco-
nomic series we use are typically persistent, instrumentation may be problematic. With
persistent data, lagged levels of the variables are weak instruments for the regression in
ﬁrst-diﬀerences. This may lead to imprecise estimates and serious small sample biases (see
e.g. Ahn and Schmidt 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998, Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer
2000). To deal with this, additional moment conditions have been suggested by Arellano
9and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) where lagged diﬀerences of the variables
are used in the levels equation. Additional non-redundant moment conditions for our case
then are,
E [∆cit−2(µi + ηit)] = 0 (10)
E [∆xit−2(µi + ηit)] = 0 (11)
for t =4 ,...,T. As noted by Arellano and Bover (1995) the validity of these additional
moment conditions is in many cases an empirical issue.7 We return to the issue of testing
these conditions in the next section.
3.2 Estimation
We use both types of moment conditions discussed in the previous section together to
estimate ψ consistently using a nonlinear GMM estimator. Given the relatively large
time series dimension and the relatively small cross-sectional dimension of our panel, we
avoid using an unmanageable number of moment conditions by choosing a ﬁxed number
of moment conditions or instruments per time period. As noted by Tauchen (1986) using
too many moment conditions may lead to biased estimates (see below in section 3.3 for
more on this). For the moment conditions presented above this implies that s is kept ﬁxed
for every value of t.W es e tmin(s)=3and max(s)=3(instrument set 1) and min(s)=3
and max(s)=4(instrument set 2). For instrument set 1, for example, we can then write
eqs.(8)-(11) more compactly as,
E(Z0
ivi)=0 (12)
where vi is the 2(T −3)×1 vector (∆ηi4,∆ηi5,...,∆ηiT,µ i +ηi4,µ i +ηi5,...,µ i +ηiT)0
7It is easily seen that these moment conditions are satisﬁed under the assumption that cit and xit are
jointly mean stationary processes. This is a suﬃcient condition however, not a necessary one. Blundell,
Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) give conditions under which for the linear model with exogenous or endoge-
nous regressors the additional moment conditions are valid when regressors (and thus regressand) have
time-varying means.
10and where Zi is the 2(T − 3) × 12(T − 3) matrix given by,
Zi =

    




i1 00 ... 0 00000 ... 0
00 ci2 x0
i2 ... 0 00000 ... 0
.... . . .. . . . . .. . . .
0000 ... ciT−3 x0
iT−3 0000 ... 0
0000 ... 00 ∆ci2 ∆x0
i2 00 ... 0
0000 ... 000 0 ∆ci3 ∆x0
i3 ... 0
.... . . .. . . . . .. . . .
0000 ... 0 00000 ... ∆x0
iT−2

    
          
  

The GMM estimator we use is b ψ =a r gm i n ψ (v0Z)WN (Z0v) where v is the 2N(T−3)×1
vector (v1,...,v N)
0,w h e r eZ is the 2N(T−3)×12(T−3) matrix given by (Z1,...,Z N)0.8 The
matrix WN is a positive deﬁnite weighting matrix. Hansen (1982) shows that the optimal
choice for WN is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions,
namely WN =( N−1 PN
i=1 Z0
ivi(b ψ1)vi(b ψ1)0Zi )−1 where b ψ1 is an initial consistent estimate
of ψ which we obtain by applying our GMM estimator using an initial parameter indepen-
dent weighting matrix.9 The optimal GMM estimator is thus obtained in two steps and is
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Under regularity conditions,
√
N(b ψ−ψ)
has an asymptotic normal distribution (i.e. asymptotics hold for N →∞ ). The variance-







. Asymptotic standard errors of b ψ then are sda(b ψ)=
q
b Vjj/N for
j =1 ,2. Since our model is overidentiﬁed (i.e. dim(Z0v) > dim(ψ) ), we use the Sargan









8Note that when we use instrument set 2 (max(s)=4 ) the dimension of vi is 2(T − 4) × 1 and the
dimension of Zi is 2(T − 4) × 18(T − 4) (i.e. one additional lag of each variable per time period in the
ﬁrst diﬀerence part of the system). Likewise v now has dimension 2N(T − 4) × 1 and Z has dimension
2N(T − 4) × 18(T − 4).







−1 where H is a block diagonal matrix
where the upper diagonal block corresponds to the ﬁrst-diﬀerence part of the system and contains ”2”’s
on its diagonal, ”-1” above and below each ”2” and ”0”’s elsewhere. The lower diagonal block corresponds
to the levels part of the system and is an identity matrix.
11Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 2000). This statistic is asymptotically χ2 distributed
under the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are valid. Degrees of freedom are
equal to dim(Z0v) − dim(ψ).T h eﬁnal statistic we are interested in makes it possible to
test the validity of the additional moment conditions given by eqs.(10) and (11). This is
the diﬀerence Sargan test (see e.g. Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 2000) which is given
by dS(b ψ)=S − S∗ where S∗ is the Sargan test that is obtained when estimating ψ by
using only the moment conditions in eqs.(8) and (9), i.e. estimating the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
part of the system only. It is asymptotically χ2 distributed under the null that the level
moment conditions are correct. Degrees of freedom are equal to dim(Z0v) − m where m
is the number of moment conditions in the restricted ﬁrst diﬀerence case (e.g. m equals
6(T − 3) for instrument set 1).
Note that even though we restrict the number of moment conditions by using a ﬁxed
number of instruments per time period, the number of moment conditions is still relatively
large compared to the cross-sectional dimension of the panel. This causes some diﬃculties
to invert the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. Therefore we use
a pseudo-inverse of this matrix as weighting matrix instead of the regular inverse (see
Arellano and Bover 1995).
Finally, we note that our parameter estimates are insensitive to the choice of the
starting values for the numerical optimization procedure for the criterion function.
3.3 Small sample inference
It is well known that GMM estimation may be problematic in samples typically encoun-
tered in practice. Problems that may occur are that coeﬃcients and standard errors are
biased and that the assumed asymptotic distributions for the test statistics poorly ap-
proximate their small sample counterparts. Tauchen (1986) for instance emphasizes the
danger of having too many moment conditions in GMM estimation. When the sample
size is small, an increase in the number of moment conditions increases eﬃciency but may
also lead to biased estimates. Biases are caused because the optimal set of moment con-
12ditions may contain instruments dated far into the past that have low correlation with
the instrumented variables (see Nelson and Startz 1990 ) or because there is a correlation
between the sample moments and the sample weight matrix (see Altonji and Segal 1994
and Ziliak 1997). Further, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the estimated asymptotic
standard errors of the eﬃcient two-step GMM estimator used in dynamic panels can be
severely (downward) biased in small samples (see also Windmeijer 2000). Recent Monte
Carlo simulations by Hall and Horowitz (1996) and Bergström, Dahlberg, and Johansson
(1997) show that asymptotic distributions and small-sample distributions of test statistics
like t-tests and Sargan tests may diﬀer considerably in small samples. To deal with these
problems, we conduct a bootstrap that allows us to check whether our estimates and (as-
ymptotic) standard errors are biased and that allows us to use small sample critical values
of (asymptotically pivotal) test statistics instead of asymptotic critical values when testing
hypotheses.10 For an example of an application of GMM bootstrap methods to dynamic
(but linear) panels we refer to Dahlberg and Johansson (2000).
We start by drawing a cross-sectional unit with probability N−1 (with replacement) and
pick out the (complete) time series for that unit. We repeat this until we have a full sample
consisting of N cross-sections. Given that changing the drawing order of a given sequence
of cross-sections does not aﬀect the bootstrap GMM estimates, the number of diﬀerent
bootstrap samples that we can draw in this way equals (((N − 1) + N)!)((N − 1)!N!)−1.
Using this bootstrap sample we construct the bootstrap equivalent of the instrument
matrix Z which we name Zb. Likewise the vector vb is the bootstrap equivalent of v.
We estimate our speciﬁcation, eq.(5), using this bootstrap sample. The bootstrap
GMM estimator is given by b ψ
b








where g = Z0v(b ψ)
are the sample moment conditions estimated from the original data (where b ψ is the second
step GMM estimate based on the original sample). We use g to recenter the bootstrap
10For linear dynamic panels Windmeijer (2000) provides an analytical small sample correction for the
asymptotic standard errors obtained with GMM estimation in two steps. In our case, since the moment
conditions are highly nonlinear in ψ, a bootstrap approach is necessary to obtain more reliable means of
inference.
13moment conditions (see Hall and Horowitz 1996). The reason is that the bootstrap treats
the original data as the population. Contrary to the population moment conditions given
in eq.(12), the sample moments Z0v(b ψ) are not equal to zero in overidentiﬁed models.
Therefore, to avoid that the bootstrap imposes moment conditions that do not hold in






















1 is the ﬁrst-step
GMM estimator based on the bootstrap sample and where g1 = Z0v(b ψ1) are the bootstrap
m o m e n t su s e dt or e c e n t e ri nt h eﬁrst step (where b ψ1 is the ﬁrst-step GMM estimate based
on the original sample). Besides b ψ
b
, we also calculate asymptotic standard errors sda(b ψ
b
),
the Sargan test S(b ψ
b
) and the diﬀerence Sargan test dS(b ψ
b
) from our bootstrap sample.
We repeat the drawing of a sample and the estimation of coeﬃcients, asymptotic
standard errors and test statistics B times where B is the number of bootstrap replications
(we set B = 200 in all cases). To check whether our estimates are biased we calculate







. We calculate the bootstrapped standard
errors as sd(b ψ)=
q





)2 . Comparison of these standard errors
with sda(b ψ) gives us an idea of whether the asymptotic standard errors are well estimated
or not.
I n s t e a do fu s i n gt h ec r i t i c a lv a l u e so ft h eχ2 distribution to test the validity of the
moment conditions, we use the critical values of the small sample distribution of the Sargan
test S(b ψ
b
) (b =1 ,...,B)a n do ft h ed i ﬀerence Sargan test dS(b ψ
b
) (b =1 ,...,B). More












where cv denotes the critical value of the small sample distribution under investigation.
To perform a one-sided test we use the percentiles 90 and 95 of these distributions as
respectively the 10% and 5% critical values.
Similarly, instead of using the critical values of the standard normal distribution to










(b =1 ,...,B). We would then reject the null hypothesis ψ = ψ0 =0
14in favour of ψ>0 if ta(b ψ)=
b ψ−ψ0






where cv are the 10% and 5% critical
values which, since the test is one-sided, correspond to the 90 and 95 percentiles of the
distribution. Note that this method of sampling and this method of constructing t-values
and testing hypotheses is the method suggested by Hall and Wilson (1991).11
One problem with the application of this method is that it may provide bad results if
the estimate of the variance is poor (see Li and Maddala 1996 ). The results reported below
suggest that the estimated asymptotic standard errors are underestimated. Therefore we
follow the suggestion by Hartigan (1986) to implement a two-level bootstrap. That is, we
calculate bootstrapped standard errors and use these instead of the unreliable asymptotic
ones to construct a correct (pivotal) t-value. Then we bootstrap again to obtain a small
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is the bootstrapped standard error obtained by bootstrapping from the (bootstrap) sample
from which b ψ
b
was estimated. The number of bootstrap replications to compute sd(b ψ
b
) for
b =1 ,...,B is set to B∗ (we set B∗ = 200 in all cases). We now reject the null hypothesis
ψ = ψ0 =0in favour of ψ>0 if t(b ψ)=
b ψ−ψ0






where cv are the 10% and 5%
critical values which, since the test is one-sided, correspond to the 90 and 95 percentile of
the distribution.12
4 Data issues
In this section we discuss the data and the data sources that we use. Data are annual and
mostly taken from OECD (2003). All data are in real terms. For private consumption
(ct) we use real aggregate consumption (code: CPV). For debt bt we use both gross and
net government debt (code: GGFL for gross debt en NGFL for net debt) deﬂated by the
consumer price index (code: CPI). Note that for Australia (gross) nominal debt is not
available from OECD before 1988, so we take the gross debt series available from the IMF
11See sampling scheme S1 with statistic T1 in Li and Maddala (1996) on page 122.
12We also test β = r(1 + r)
−1 versus β 6= r(1 + r)
−1 (two-sided test) by using the percentiles 2.5 and
97.5 of the t(b β
b
) distribution as 5% critical values and percentiles 5 and 95 as 10% critical values.
15(IFS, 2000). For government expenditures gt (consumption and investment) we use real
government investment (code: IGV) plus real government consumption (code: CGV). For
taxes minus net transfers (tt) we calculate real government expenditures minus the real
primary deﬁcit. The nominal primary deﬁcit (code: NLGX) is deﬂated by the consumer
price index. For pre-tax income (yt) real GDP (code: GDPV) is used. The advantage of
this measure is that it excludes interest income on government bonds as is the case for yt
in the theory. Private sector wealth excluding government bonds (wt) is proxied through
the real capital stock of the business sector (code: KBV) plus real net foreign assets. Net
foreign assets are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b) and are ﬁrst set
from USD into local currency through purchasing power parities (code: PPP) after which
they are deﬂated by the consumer price index. For the complications encountered with
this series for Belgium we refer to Pozzi (2003). Finally, we divide all series by population
(code: POP) to obtain per capita measures and we scale the variables by dividing all
observations in one country by that country’s real per capita GDP in the ﬁrst year of the
sample.
Data availability determines the sample period which is 1980-1997. The sample con-
tains 19 countries if gross government debt is used: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, and USA. When using net government debt Australia,
Greece, and Ireland drop out since no net government debt series is available for these
countries.
5R e s u l t s
The results from estimating eq.(5) with instrument set 1 using the gross government debt
are presented in table 1. We refer to section 3.2 for the description of this instrument set.
Interest rates are set respectively to 0.03, 0.05, and 0.07. The point estimates for β and
λ have the expected signs and plausible values. Using the critical values of the two-level
bootstrapped small sample distribution of the t-values, only in the case r =0 .07 we ﬁnd
16that β is signiﬁcantly higher than zero at the 10% level. Further, the point estimates for
β are in general smaller than the value of the marginal propensity to consume in the case
of certainty equivalence (i.e. the value for r
1+r). Interpreting this in terms of our model
it implies that forward looking consumers may have a precautionary savings motive that
potentially oﬀsets their impatience. We can however not reject the hypothesis β = r
1+r at
the usual levels of signiﬁcance (results not reported but available upon request).
The point estimates for λ are signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level. Over the period
1980-1997 these results suggest that about 25% of consumers in OECD countries are rule-
of-thumb current income consumers. This result is within the range of country-speciﬁc
estimates found for this fraction in other studies (see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw 1991,
Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997). As far as panel studies are concerned, it is more or less in line
with the fraction estimated by Evans and Karras (1998) for 66 development and industrial
countries over the period 1970-1989. It is however substantially lower than the 40% found
by Lopez et al. (2000) for OECD countries over the period 1975-1992. Possibly the
diﬀerence stems from the diﬀerent panel methodology employed. Lopez et al. (2000) apply
a ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator to a consumption function derived in ﬁrst diﬀerences
(thus diﬀerencing the data twice before estimation), whereas we avoid diﬀerencing by
applying the system GMM estimator to an equation with variables expressed in levels.
If we compare the usual GMM asymptotic standard errors with the bootstrapped ones,
we can see that the former are considerably lower than the latter for both β and λ in all
cases. This result is in accordance with the problem of underestimated standard errors
of two-step GMM estimators as reported by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer
(2000). The observed biases in the point estimates are negligible however. The problems
encountered do justify a posteriori the use of (two-level) bootstrapped distributions for
the t-values to conduct inference.
If we look at the Sargan test and the diﬀerence Sargan test we ﬁnd no evidence against
our model and instruments. Using the reported p-values we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the moment conditions are correct (for the Sargan test) and that the level
moment conditions are correct (for the diﬀerence Sargan test). Thus, our approach of
17using a ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation combined with a levels speciﬁcation to avoid informa-
tion loss seems justiﬁed. We also note that the bootstrapped distributions (and thus the
critical values) for both these test statistics diﬀer considerable from the asymptotic ones
so that, again, our bootstrap approach is appropriate and necessary.
In table 2 we present the results of estimating eq.(5) with the net government debt.
Though net government debt may be a more appropriate measure for debt in a Ricar-
dian model, data are now only available for sixteen OECD countries instead of nineteen.
The cross-sectional dimension is now somewhat smaller than the time dimension. The
conclusions regarding the point estimates and the signiﬁcance of β and λ are identical to
those reported in table 1. The Sargan and the diﬀerence Sargan test do not reject the
moment conditions. The only exception is the case r =0 .03 where the diﬀerence Sargan
test reveals some evidence of misspeciﬁcation when using the level moment conditions.
As a robustness check we estimate eq.(5) using a diﬀerent instrument set (instrument
set 2 which is explained in section 3.2). The results for gross government debt are reported
in table 3, those for net government debt in table 4. The conclusions reached are largely
identical to those reported for tables 1 and 2.
Finally, we note that the estimation of eq.(5) for the 80s and 90s seperately does not
reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the point estimates for λ and β between these two periods
or between these subperiods and the full sample period (results not reported but available
upon request). Thus, for the OECD countries as a whole, there is no indication of shifts
in time of the fraction of current income consumers during the 80s versus the 90s. Since
the evidence on time-variation in the excess sensitivity of private consumption to current
income in individual country studies is mixed (see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw 1991,
Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997), this result is not inconsistent with the existing literature.
186 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the Ricardian Equivalence proposition for a panel of OECD
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. We use a model with two consumer types. One type
of consumers is rule-of-thumb and follows current income, the other type is a permanent
income consumer who incorporates the government budget constraint. The presence of
the ﬁrst type constitutes a deviation from the Ricardian Equivalence proposition. We also
allow for a second deviation from Ricardian Equivalence, a precautionary savings eﬀect,
by allowing that permanent income consumers consume less out of permanent income
than what they would consume in the case of certainty equivalence. Methodologically,
we focus on the problems of information loss and small sample inference when estimating
dynamic panels. As far as the ﬁrst issue is concerned, we avoid the loss of information that
comes with ﬁrst-diﬀerence transformations by deriving a testable consumption function
that is in levels to begin with. Then, we use a nonlinear GMM estimator that uses
moment conditions that exploit information from the levels of the variables that appear
in the consumption function. As for the second issue, we use both one-level and two-level
GMM bootstraps to conduct inference and to check whether our estimates and asymptotic
standard errors are biased.
Our results suggest that about 25% of the consumers in OECD countries over the
period 1980-1997 are rule-of-thumb consumers and that the remaining fraction are perma-
nent income consumers who incorporate the government budget constraint. This remain-
ing 75% of consumers may not be strictly Ricardian however since the marginal propensity
to consume out of permanent income of these consumers is lower (though not signiﬁcantly
so) than what we would expect in the certainty equivalence case which underlies Ricardian
Equivalence. We conclude that Ricardian Equivalence is rejected. Our model and each
type of moment conditions we use in the estimations is supported by the data. This jus-
tiﬁes the use of information from the levels of the variables to obtain estimates. Further,
our point estimates are not biased, but the asymptotic standard errors are, as exptected,
underestimated. The asymptotic distributions of the test statistics poorly approximate
19their small sample counterparts justifying our bootstrap approach to conduct inference.
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Appendix A: derivation of linearized ﬁrst-order condition



































Furthermore, we assume a constant conditional uncentered second moment of con-
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Appendix B: derivation of eq.(5)
Suppose we have a variable xt and a discount rate m,s ot h a tw ec a nw r i t e ,
∞ X
j=0





(1 + m)−jxt+j−1 − xt−1


After taking expectations at time t of both sides and adding and subtracting the term
(1 + m)
P∞
j=0(1 + m)−jEt−1 [xt+j−1] at the RHS, following equation is obtained,
∞ X
j=0












(1 + m)−j+1 (Et [xt+j−1] − Et−1 [xt+j−1])
Replace xt with yt and gt and m with r to obtain,
∞ X
j=0





(1 + r)−jEt−1 [yt+j−1] − yt−1

 + eyt (B1)
∞ X
j=0





(1 + r)−jEt−1 [gt+j−1] − gt−1

 + egt (B2)








(1 + r + ρ)−j+1 (Et [gt+j−1] − Et−1 [gt+j−1])
25Substituting eqs.(1) and (3) into eq.(4), we obtain,
ct = λ(yt − tt)+β(
∞ X
j=0
(1 + r)−jEt[(1 − λ)(yt+j − gt+j + wt + λbt)] (B3)








(1 + r)−jEt−1 [gt+j−1] − βwt−1 − βλbt−1
Moreover, using eqs.(B1)-(B2) into eq.(B3), we obtain,





(1 + r)−jEt−1 [yt+j−1] − yt−1

 (B5)





(1 + r)−jEt−1 [gt+j−1] − gt−1


−β(1 − λ)egt + βwt + βλbt
Plugging eq.(13) into eq.(13) leads to eq.(5) with,
ηt = β(1 − λ)(eyt − egt)
26Tables
Table 1. Estimation results for eq.(5) with instrument set 1 and gross government debt
(19 OECD countries, annual data, 1980-1997).
(1) (2) (3)
r=0.03 r=0.05 r=0.07
β est 0.014 0.025 0.034*
sda 0.009 0.009 0.008
sd 0.039 0.044 0.040
bias 0.006 0.003 0.000
λ est 0.258** 0.254** 0.250**
sda 0.017 0.017 0.017
sd 0.054 0.057 0.052
bias -0.002 0.005 0.003
S pval 0.430 0.435 0.455
df 178 178 178
dS pval 0.315 0.320 0.310
df 90 90 90
Notes: we refer to section 3.2 for details on instrument sets. est i st h es e c o n ds t e pG M Mp o i n t
estimate, sda is the asymptotic standard error, sd is the bootstrapped standard error, bias is the
bias in the point estimate, S is the Sargan test, dS is the diﬀerence Sargan test, pval (p-value) is
calculated from the bootstrapped distributions of the Sargan test statistic and diﬀerence Sargan
test statistic. It equals 1 minus the percentile that coincides with the value found for these tests in
the estimation. The null hypothesis is that the moment conditions are correct for S and that the
level moment conditions are correct for dS. df are the degrees of freedom. * (**) indicates that the
estimate is signiﬁcantly larger than zero at the 10% (5%) level of conﬁdence. This one-sided test
uses the 90 and 95 percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of t-values (two-level bootstrap).
We refer to sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
27Table 2. Estimation results for eq.(5) with instrument set 1 and net government debt
(16 OECD countries, annual data, 1980-1997).
(1) (2) (3)
r=0.03 r=0.05 r=0.07
β est 0.014 0.025 0.034*
sda 0.011 0.009 0.008
sd 0.052 0.054 0.048
bias 0.000 0.004 0.005
λ est 0.262** 0.257** 0.251**
sda 0.020 0.020 0.020
sd 0.056 0.057 0.055
bias -0.011 -0.010 -0.004
S pval 0.150 0.160 0.175
df 178 178 178
dS pval 0.040 0.110 0.120
df 90 90 90
Notes: we refer to section 3.2 for details on instrument sets. est i st h es e c o n ds t e pG M Mp o i n t
estimate, sda is the asymptotic standard error, sd is the bootstrapped standard error, bias is the
bias in the point estimate, S is the Sargan test, dS is the diﬀerence Sargan test, pval (p-value) is
calculated from the bootstrapped distributions of the Sargan test statistic and diﬀerence Sargan
test statistic. It equals 1 minus the percentile that coincides with the value found for these tests in
the estimation. The null hypothesis is that the moment conditions are correct for S and that the
level moment conditions are correct for dS. df are the degrees of freedom. * (**) indicates that the
estimate is signiﬁcantly larger than zero at the 10% (5%) level of conﬁdence. This one-sided test
uses the 90 and 95 percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of t-values (two-level bootstrap).
We refer to sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
28Table 3. Estimation results for eq.(5) with instrument set 2 and gross government
debt (19 OECD countries, annual data, 1980-1997).
(1) (2) (3)
r=0.03 r=0.05 r=0.07
β est 0.014 0.025 0.035*
sda 0.013 0.013 0.012
sd 0.041 0.035 0.034
bias 0.006 0.004 0.006
λ est 0.263** 0.259** 0.255**
sda 0.013 0.014 0.015
sd 0.057 0.054 0.049
bias -0.005 -0.001 -0.002
S pval 0.310 0.355 0.290
df 250 250 250
dS pval 0.395 0.465 0.390
df 84 84 84
Notes: we refer to section 3.2 for details on instrument sets. est i st h es e c o n ds t e pG M Mp o i n t
estimate, sda is the asymptotic standard error, sd is the bootstrapped standard error, bias is the
bias in the point estimate, S is the Sargan test, dS is the diﬀerence Sargan test, pval (p-value) is
calculated from the bootstrapped distributions of the Sargan test statistic and diﬀerence Sargan
test statistic. It equals 1 minus the percentile that coincides with the value found for these tests in
the estimation. The null hypothesis is that the moment conditions are correct for S and that the
level moment conditions are correct for dS. df are the degrees of freedom. * (**) indicates that the
estimate is signiﬁcantly larger than zero at the 10% (5%) level of conﬁdence. This one-sided test
uses the 90 and 95 percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of t-values (two-level bootstrap).
We refer to sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
29Table 4. Estimation results for eq.(5) with instrument set 2 and net government debt
(16 OECD countries, annual data, 1980-1997).
(1) (2) (3)
r=0.03 r=0.05 r=0.07
β est 0.015 0.026 0.035
sda 0.018 0.016 0.015
sd 0.047 0.046 0.048
bias 0.009 0.006 0.005
λ est 0.270** 0.264** 0.259**
sda 0.017 0.016 0.016
sd 0.056 0.061 0.053
bias -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
S pval 0.165 0.160 0.185
df 250 250 250
dS pval 0.240 0.165 0.130
df 84 84 84
Notes: we refer to section 3.2 for details on instrument sets. est i st h es e c o n ds t e pG M Mp o i n t
estimate, sda is the asymptotic standard error, sd is the bootstrapped standard error, bias is the
bias in the point estimate, S is the Sargan test, dS is the diﬀerence Sargan test, pval (p-value) is
calculated from the bootstrapped distributions of the Sargan test statistic and diﬀerence Sargan
test statistic. It equals 1 minus the percentile that coincides with the value found for these tests in
the estimation. The null hypothesis is that the moment conditions are correct for S and that the
level moment conditions are correct for dS. df are the degrees of freedom. * (**) indicates that the
estimate is signiﬁcantly larger than zero at the 10% (5%) level of conﬁdence. This one-sided test
uses the 90 and 95 percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of t-values (two-level bootstrap).
We refer to sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
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